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SELF-REGULATION OF INSIDER-TRADING 
IN MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS 
Tamar Frankel* 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial services providers such as investment advisers, investment 
managers, underwriters, and brokers produce or possess financial insider-
information. Insider-information is inherent in their very services for a 
number of reasons. First, as part of their work financial services providers 
should glean as much information as they can about target investments, 
including nonpublic information. Second, financial servicers create a 
temporary or lasting effect on securities market prices by offering 
investment advice to a large number of followers or to large clients. Third, 
the performances of some financial servicers, such as mutual funds 
management and investment advice, may affect the securities prices 
markets in which they determine to trade or guarantee for their clients or for 
their institutions’ trading. After all, at the end of 2012, mutual funds alone 
held over $26 trillion in worldwide assets.1 
Thus, by definition, financial servicers either gain nonpublic 
information or create it. In fact, financial servicers are similar to legislators. 
Legislators, too, receive insider-information and may make decisions that 
enhance or reduce the profitability of enterprises and, consequently, the 
price of the enterprises’ securities.2 
It is not surprising that financial servicers and their personnel must 
grapple with a strong and continuous temptation to use insider-information 
for their own benefit or for the benefit of selected others, such as family 
members or friends. In contrast, the law that prohibits insider-trading often 
remains unenforced. The reason is that outside regulators face great 
difficulty and high costs in detecting and preventing the use of insider-
information by those related to financial servicers’ institutions. Therefore, 
the legal prohibition on insider trading is enforced after the fact or remains 
a dead letter. A legal prohibition in and by itself might deter violations. But 
in this case the prohibition is not very effective. The possibility of quick 
collections of large sums of money and the low risk of discovery may trump 
the prohibition. 
And yet, throughout the years, there have been relatively few cases 
concerning insider-trading by regulated mutual funds and advisory service 
personnel. From 1980 to 2012, according to a LEXIS search, the U.S. 
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 1. See INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 25 (53d ed. 2013), available 
at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf. 
 2. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2011). 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed thirty-one enforcement 
actions under Rule 17j-1 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.3 
Significantly, the most recent proceedings are dated from 2007,4 and none 
were found for the past five years before that date. Eight of the thirty-one 
proceedings involved violations of the substantive provision of Rule 17j-1, 
that is, the direct prohibition on certain fraudulent activities.5 Twelve of the 
proceedings involved violations of the individual companies’ established 
codes of ethics (Codes of Ethics or Codes) requirements,6 including one 
case in which performing transactions in violation of a Code was deemed 
aiding and abetting a violation of the Code requirements.7 There was one 
insider-trading case against an investment company in 1990,8 one against 
an investment adviser and a portfolio manager in 1995,9 and another against 
an investment adviser in 1997.10 
In 2012 the SEC alleged that a consulting firm and its manager obtained 
material nonpublic information and provided it to clients, who were 
“portfolio managers and analysts at prominent hedge funds and other 
nationally recognized investment advisors.”11 In 2011 the SEC claimed that 
an employee’s trades followed the trades at his former employer’s 
exchange-traded fund (ETF) desk.12 When the SEC focused on insider-
trading in the last four years, regulated mutual funds and their managers and 
employees took a back seat to corporations, hedge funds, investment banks, 
bank managers, and their employees.13  
                                                                                                                 
 3. Result of LEXIS search performed Feb. 1, 2013, in “SEC Decisions, Orders & Releases.” 
 4. Brod, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2673, Investment Company Act Release No. 
28,022, 91 SEC Docket 2377 (Oct. 24, 2007). 
 5. E.g., id.; Buchner, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2282, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,580, 83 SEC Docket 1961 (Aug. 26, 2004); Speaker, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 22,461, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1605, Exchange Act Release No. 
38,161, 63 SEC Docket 1640 (Jan. 13, 1997).  
 6. E.g., Van Wagoner, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2281, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,579, 83 SEC Docket 1955 (Aug. 26, 2004); Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2192, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,255, 81 SEC Docket 
1913 (Nov. 13, 2003); Gintel Asset Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2079, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 25,798, Exchange Act Release No. 46,798, 2002 WL 
31499839 (Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Gintel Release]. 
 7. Gintel Release, supra note 6.  
 8. SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 9. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1494, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 21,113, 59 SEC Docket 1103 (June 6, 1995). 
 10. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1630, 64 SEC Docket 
1207 (Apr. 28, 1997). 
 11. Complaint at 2, SEC v. Kinnucan, No. 12-CV-1230 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/lit igation/complaints/2012/comp22261.pdf. 
 12. Mindlin, Securities Act Release No. 9261, Exchange Act Release No. 65,372, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3284, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,813, 101 SEC Docket 
3911 (Sept. 21, 2011). 
 13. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, SEC, http://www.sec.gov 
/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last modified Oct. 25, 2013) (summarizing enforcement 
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Mutual funds are required to impose Codes of Ethics on many of their 
employees. Did this requirement make a difference? After all, similar Codes 
proliferate in many other financial and business corporations14 with fairly 
miserable results. In fact, the temptations facing employees and managers 
of many business corporations that published self-imposed Codes are 
relatively weaker than the temptations facing employees and managers of 
mutual funds. Yet as compared to mutual funds, these business companies 
have failed to prevent insider-trading! 
I believe that regulated mutual funds are less prone to insider-trading 
than non-regulated funds and traders because their Codes of Ethics have 
introduced enforcement mechanisms and have influenced their culture. 
Regulated mutual funds’ Codes of Ethics are accompanied by four features 
that may have helped reduce the zeal of temptation for insider-trading: 
 
(1) The Codes are far from voluntary. They are required by law. 
(2) The Codes contain both general principles and self-enforcement 
mechanisms. 
(3) Mutual funds depend not only on their performance but, like other 
financial services, are heavily dependent on investors’ trust. The 
managers of regulated mutual funds recognize that a hint of unfair 
treatment can decimate their entire business and may result in 
“runs.” Similar to banks, open-end funds must offer investors 
redemption within seven days of demand, with few exceptions.15 
Mutual funds receive investors’ demands, and in seven days 
investors must receive their money!16 
(4) The Investment Company Institute—the professional and trade 
organization of investment advisers that manage mutual funds—has 
supported the legally required provisions of the Code. 
 
It may well be that these four conditions help increase the deterrent effect, 
reduce temptation within an organization, strengthen the prohibition on 
insider-trading, and—most importantly—establish a culture of compliance. 
                                                                                                                 
actions relating to hedge funds and similar organizations, rather than mutual funds, from late 2009 
to present). 
 14. See, e.g., DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, CODE OF ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
(2013), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets 
/Documents/us_about_ei_coe2013_06042013.pdf (accounting firm); U.S. BANK, CODE OF ETHICS 
AND BUSINESS CONDUCT (2013), available at https://usbank.com/hr/docs/policies 
/coeHandbook.pdf (bank); WHIRLPOOL CORP., CODE OF ETHICS (2006) available at  
http://www.whirlpoolcorp.com/shared/content/responsibility/code-of-ethics.pdf (manufacturing 
firm). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012) (general rule); 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.22e-1 to -3 (2013) 
(exceptions). 
 16. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e). 
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This Article concludes with two questions. First: what is not included in 
the Code of Ethics? And second: does it pay to internalize enforcement, and 
if so, to whom? The following is a discussion of each of these four 
components. 
I. THE CODES OF ETHICS IMPOSED ON MUTUAL FUNDS 
HAVE BEEN INDUCED AND SUPPORTED BY LAW 
A. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 17 (RULE 17J-1)18 
Rule 17j-1 requires investment companies to establish Codes of 
Ethics.19 The Rule’s requirement applies both to the investment company’s 
investment adviser and principal underwriter.20 The principal underwriter is 
very important to open-end investment companies because these companies 
issue redeemable securities.21 Investors may demand their money, not 
because they are dissatisfied with the performance of their funds but 
because they need the money.22 Yet, heavy demand may shrink the fund’s 
portfolio and raise the cost of managing it.23 The dependency of mutual 
funds on principal underwriters is the main reason for regulating their 
Codes of Ethics.24 
B. RULE 17J-1 PROVIDES DETAILED REQUIREMENTS REGARDING 
THE SUBSTANCE OF CODES OF ETHICS  
Codes must contain specific self-enforcing provisions. These provisions 
must be implemented not only to punish violators but to prevent violations 
of the federal securities laws. The requirements include oversight of 
compliance by the investment adviser, principal underwriter, administrator, 
and transfer agent.25 Under Rule 38a-1, the funds’ boards of directors are 
required to approve the policies and procedures—the Codes—of the 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. §§ 80a-1 to -64. 
 18. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. § 270.17j-1(c)(1)(i). 
 21. 2 T AMAR FRANKEL & ANN T AYLOR SCHWING, T HE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 
§ 9.03[D], at 9-56 (2002) (noting investment companies’ dependence on distribution of their 
securities); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(b) (requiring principal underwriter for registered open-end 
investment company to have written contract). 
 22. See Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,782, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 13,328, 13,328 (Mar. 18, 2005) (noting that mutual funds’ “redemption right makes funds 
attractive to fund investors, most of whom are long-term investors, because it  provides ready 
access to their money if they should need it”). 
 23. See, e.g., Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. Corp., 895 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A]n 
enormous and rapid shrinkage in asset size is potentially very damaging . . . . Lower total assets 
would also result  in a higher effective advisory charge to remaining shareholders because of the 
economies of scale of fund management.”). 
 24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 25. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(1). 
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investment adviser, principal underwriter, administrator, and transfer 
agent.26 A few details are interesting: 
1. The Code must subject “access persons” to reporting of their 
personal securities transactions and holdings. 27 An access person is a 
“supervised person who has access to nonpublic information regarding 
clients’ purchase or sale of securities, is involved in making securities 
recommendations to clients or who has access to such recommendations 
that are nonpublic.”28 “A supervised person who has access to nonpublic 
information regarding the portfolio holdings of affiliated mutual funds” is 
an access person as well.29 
Thus, access persons include “portfolio management personnel and, in 
some organizations, client service representatives who communicate 
investment advice to clients” (even if they did not prepare the advice).30 
“These employees [gain] information about investment recommendations 
whose effect may not yet be felt in the marketplace; [therefore], they 
may be in a position to take advantage of their inside knowledge.”31 
“Administrative, technical, and clerical personnel may also be access 
persons if their functions or duties [require] access to nonpublic-
information.”32 
There is no specific and fixed definition of the word “access” with 
respect to insider-information. Access is measured by the organizations’ 
controls and structures.33 If an organization has a large number of 
employees with broad responsibilities, yet imposes on them few barriers to 
insider-information, the organization may have to consider a larger percentage 
of its staff to be access persons.34 In contrast, if an organization keeps strict 
controls on sensitive information, it may be deemed to have fewer access 
persons.35 Thus, the position of the employees is not the only consideration. 
The internal controls of the organization play a part in the definition of 
“access” as well. Rule 204A-1 provides a “presumption that, if the firm’s 
primary business is providing investment advice, then all of its directors, 
officers and partners will also be access persons.”36 Therefore, in many 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. § 270.17j-1(d). 
 28. Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2256, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,492, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696, 41,698 (July 9, 2004) 
[hereinafter Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release]. 
 29. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(a)(1) (general definition); id. § 270.17j-1(a)(1)(i) 
(incorporating definition of “Advisory Person of a Fund or of a Fund’s investment adviser”); id.  
§ 270.17j-1(a)(2) (defining “Advisory Person of a Fund or of a Fund’s investment adviser”). 
 30. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. (noting relationship between access and information barriers or controls). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(e)(1)(ii)). 
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advisory firms, directors, officers, and partners will be access persons as 
well. 
2. The Code should impose on an adviser’s access persons a 
requirement to periodically report their personal securities transactions and 
holdings.37 
The report should be forwarded to the adviser’s chief compliance 
officer or other designated persons.38 The adviser should review the reports 
to ensure that the adviser and the SEC examiner would be able to “identify 
improper trades or patterns of trading by access persons.”39 The reports are 
modeled largely on the requirements in Rule 17j-1.40 
3. Even though Rule 17j-1 contains no requirement to adopt many of 
the detailed, prophylactic measures common to many Codes, advisory firms 
usually include in their Codes many of the following elements: 
a. Access persons must have prior written approval (or “pre-
clearance”) before they can place a personal securities transaction and may 
trade in securities only through particular brokers. These persons could be 
limited with respect to the number of brokerage accounts they may hold.41 
b. Advisers s hould pr e pa r e  “duplicate trade confirmations 
and account statements” and set forth procedures for assigning new 
securities analyses to employees. These employees’ personal holdings 
should not present apparent conflicts of interest.42 
c. An advisory firm should maintain lists of the issuers of 
securities that the Advisory firm is analyzing or recommending for clients. 
Advisers are prohibited from “personal trading in securities of those 
issuers.”43 In addition, the firm must maintain “‘restricted lists’ of issuers 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(d). 
 41. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698; INV. CO. INST., 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING, at vii, 14–15, app. II at  4 (1994) 
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING], available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_personal_investing.pdf. 
 42. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698; REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING, supra note 41, at vii, 45. 
 43. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698; REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING, supra note 41, app. II at  4; FRANKEL & SCHWING, 
supra note 21, § 13.04, at 13-64 (citing INV. ADVISER ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE (2010), 
available at https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/Reports_and 
_Brochures/IAA_Standards_of_Practice/Standards_of_Practice_2010_final.pdf (“The parameters 
of an investment adviser’s duty depend on the scope of the advisory relationship and generally 
include . . . the duty to respect the confidentiality of client information.”)); CFA INST., CODE OF 
ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT para. III.E.1–3 (2010), available at 
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2010.n14.1 (“Members and Candidates must keep 
information about current, former, and prospective clients confidential unless: (1) The information 
concerns illegal activities on the part of the client or prospective client, (2) Disclosure is required 
by law, or (3) The client or prospective client permits disclosure of the information.”); Code of 
Ethics & Professional Responsibility, CERTIFIED FIN. PLANNER BOARD OF STANDARDS, 
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about which the Advisory firm has inside information, and prohibitions on 
any trading (personal or for clients) in securities of those issuers.”44 The 
firm should impose “‘blackout periods’ when client securities trades are 
being placed” or recommended. Access persons may not personally engage 
in transactions in these securities.45 
d. Access persons must be reminded that investment 
opportunities should be offered to clients first, before the adviser or its 
employees may act on such opportunities.46 The Adviser must have 
procedures to implement this directive.47 
4. The Code should prohibit “‘short-swing’ trading and market 
timing.”48 
5. The Code should require initial and annual holdings and quarterly 
transaction reports,49 with three exceptions: “transactions effected pursuant 
to an automatic investment plan,”50 “securities held in accounts over which 
the access person had no direct or indirect influence or control,”51 and a 
report that would “duplicate information contained in [broker] trade 
confirmations or account statements” provided that recordkeeping 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.cfp.net/for-cfp-professionals/professional-standards-enforcement/standards-of-
professional-conduct/code-of-ethics-professional-responsibility (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) 
(“Protect the confidentiality of all client information. Confidentiality means ensuring that 
information is accessible only to those authorized to have access. A relationship of trust and 
confidence with the client can only be built  upon the understanding that the client’s information 
will remain confidential.”); Code of Ethics, FIN. PLANNING ASS’N, http://www.fpanet.org 
/AboutFPA/CodeofEthics/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (“An FPA member shall not disclose any 
confidential client information without the specific consent of the client unless in response to 
proper legal process, to defend against charges of wrongdoing by the FPA member or in 
connection with a civil dispute between the FPA member and client.”); see FINRA Manual: 
Contents, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element 
_id=8849 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (FINRA Rule 2060, which has superseded NASD Rule 
3120); cf. W. E. SELL, AGENCY § 136, at 123 (1975) (“An agent has a duty not to reveal or use 
any confidential information received from his principal for his own or another’s benefit .” The 
term “confidential information” has been construed to include all information that the agent 
should be aware the principal would not want revealed, for example, a list  of preferred customers 
or a manufacturing process. “Confidential information” does not include generally known 
information.); John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail Sale of Mutual 
Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685 (2007). 
 44. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698. 
 45. Id.; see also REPORT ON THE ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING, supra note 41, 
at 36. 
 46. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698. 
 47. Id.; see also REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING, supra note 41, 
at 27 (stating principle that client interests should come first). 
 48. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28; see also INV. CO. INST., supra 
note 41, at vii. 
 49. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28; 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-
1(b)(1)(ii)(A)–(B), (2) (2013). 
 50. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,699; see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.204A-1(b)(3)(ii). 
 51. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,699; see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.204A-1(b)(3)(i). 
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requirements are met.52 There is an additional exception if the advisory firm 
“has only one access person, so long as the firm maintains records of the 
holdings and transactions that Rule 204A-1 would otherwise require be 
reported.”53 
6. The Code “must require that access persons obtain the adviser’s 
approval before investing in an initial public offering (‘IPO’) or private 
placement.”54 This issue is debated. Because “[m]ost individuals rarely have 
the opportunity to invest in these types of securities[,] an access person’s 
IPO or private placement purchase raises issues.”55 To what extent does the 
employee “misappropriat[e] an investment opportunity that should first be 
offered to eligible clients”?56 Or is a portfolio manager “receiving a personal 
benefit for directing client business or brokerage”?57 Yet it seems that these 
actions should generally be prohibited. One signal is Rule 204A-1’s 
exception for advisory firms with only one access person.58 
C.  THE CODES IMPOSE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS SUCH AS 
REPORTING VIOLATIONS AND EDUCATING EMPLOYEES 
“[E]ach adviser’s code of ethics must require prompt internal reporting 
of any violations of the code. Violations must be reported to the adviser’s 
chief compliance officer.”59 Further, “an adviser’s code of ethics must 
require the adviser to provide each supervised person with a copy of the 
code of ethics and any amendments.”60 This requirement reduces the cost of 
government examiners. 
Nonetheless, a Code of Ethics differs from a statute or regulation by 
offering more flexibility. Instead of requiring evidence in writing and a 
review by independent experts, the Codes may offer, for example, to 
include mechanisms that help the institutions enforce the Code rules. This 
flexibility allows for adjusting the rules to fit the particular functions, size, 
and culture of subject institutions. Advisers have more discretion to design 
their Codes and facilitate enforcement of the rules. 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,699; see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.204A-1(b)(3)(iii). 
 53. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,699; see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.204A-1(d). 
 54. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,700; see also REPORT OF 
THE ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING, supra note 41, at 32–34. 
 55. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,700. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at  41,699; cf. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(d) (exempting a company with a single access 
person from the requirement of obtaining approval for investments in any security in an IPO or in 
a limited offering). 
 59. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,700; see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.204A-1(a)(4). 
 60. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,700; see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.204A-1(a)(5). 
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It is interesting that the SEC did not prohibit insiders within advisory 
organizations from securities trading.61 After all, such a requirement would 
have made the issues and enforcement simpler.62 Yet it was recognized that 
a prohibition (like the prohibition on alcohol drinking) will be difficult, if 
not impossible, to enforce. People who deal with securities trading and 
management are engrossed in their activities. The assumption seems to have 
been that a total prohibition might lead to increased avoidance and costlier 
enforcement.  
The sanctions for violating a Code of Ethics are crucial to its viability. 
Employers must enforce the rules and punish its violations. The SEC backs 
these sanctions with more severe ones, such as disqualification from 
engaging ever again in the service or trade.63 Rule 17j-1 requires 
compliance procedures and practices to prevent Code violations.64 These 
requirements apply only to registered investment companies and their 
advisers and principal underwriters.65 Lawyers and compliance officers 
play a role in enforcing the law. While legal provisions may disqualify 
violators from continuing to practice,66 they rarely impose termination of 
the violators’ employment. In contrast, private enforcement by employers 
for violations of Codes of Ethics can involve reduced bonuses, demotion, 
and termination of employment, among other disciplinary actions. Thus, to 
this extent the employers’ enforcement power is not only vested in them but 
provides more, alternative enforcement measures. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN STRENGTHENING 
THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PROVISIONS OF THE CODE 
The requirement to establish a Code was negotiated with the Investment 
Company Institute, and that led to an agreement before Congress.67 The 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING, supra note 41, at 19–25 
(discussing Advisory Group’s consideration of total ban on personal investing by portfolio 
managers). 
 62. See id. at  20 (noting that such a ban may be a “clear standard to follow” and “relatively 
easy to implement and administer and less burdensome and costly than the alternatives”). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(b), 80b-3(f) (2012). 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(c)(2)(i) (2013). 
 65. Id. (requiring “Fund, investment adviser and principal underwriter” to institute procedures 
to prevent violations of Code of Ethics); Id. § 270.17j-1(a)(5) (defining “Fund” as “an investment 
company registered under the Investment Company Act”).  
 66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(b), 80b-3(f). 
 67. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 9510 Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 
73 n.27 (1967) (statement of the SEC); see id. at 80, 84–85 (The SEC recommended changes to 
provisions of Senate Bill 1659, reflecting upon how both SEC staff and representatives of the 
Investment Company Institute had agreed “that the purposes intended by the proposed amendment 
would be more precisely delineated if the amendment prohibited insider trading in contravention 
of such rules as the Commission may adopt to define fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative 
practices and to prescribe means reasonably necessary to prevent such practices.” The Investment 
Company Institute agreed that SEC would be authorized “to adopt rules with respect to minimum 
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Code’s provisions are supported by private organizations. The Investment 
Company Institute—the professional/trade organization of investment 
advisers that manage mutual funds68—has established a Code which is 
intended to prevent insider-trading and sets higher standards than the Code 
required by regulations.69 Similarly, the Investment Adviser Association 
(the IAA) has established a Code prohibiting violations of general fiduciary 
duties (e.g., conflicts of interest and non-disclosure).70 Membership in the 
IAA is not required, but membership requires endorsement of the 
standards.71 
In sum, pressured by the public, the professional organizations, 
combined with a shadow of SEC enforcement and specific internal 
enforcement, may be able to increase the strength of enforcement by the 
management and reduce government enforcement. 
III. WHAT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CODE OF ETHICS? 
Just as interesting as the contents of Codes of Ethics is what is not 
included in the requirements concerning the Code. Open many books on 
Codes of Ethics and you will find at the outset a discussion of ethics.72 This 
requirement is missing here. The word “Ethics” appears in the title of the 
Code. Yet, there is no direct requirement to behave in an ethical way. This 
is not, in my opinion, an error. It is intentional. 
The reason may have been spelled out in another examination of 
effective Codes of Ethics. The advice in that source is to avoid “positions 
that are generally held in society” such as: “obey the law.”73 A Code is also 
a piece of literature. Its writing and expressions can be inspirational or 
deadly boring. Therefore, avoidance of well-trodden words is desirable. 
Highly generalized expressions do not lend help when applying the rules to 
everyday, specific activities. Highly detailed rules are mind-numbing, but 
also invite circumvention. Although precision can be understood, everyday 
work involves activities that do not necessarily fall into the precise 
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 68. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON PERSONAL INVESTING, supra note 41, at 8 
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 69. Id. app. I.  
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language of Codes of Ethics. Therefore, something in-between is most 
desirable. 
Have these materials decreased the prevalence of insider-trading? They 
have not. Have I assumed that the rate of insider-trading by advisory firms 
is related to their Codes of Ethics? I have not. Arguably, the reason for the 
lower use of insider-trading is that employees in these organizations are 
well rewarded. I reject this argument. People who deal with money are 
usually hungry for money. For such people there is never enough. For 
people who are envious of richer people, there are always those who have 
more.74 Therefore, the explanation must be different for people who deal 
with money and make enormous returns for others but are not likely to use 
the easier path to financial success by insider-trading. 
Codes of Ethics contribute to the low incidence of insider-trading for a 
number of reasons. In this Article I deal with just one contribution: culture. 
Culture is a social habit. Our culture requires us to wear clothes in public. A 
social habit is beneficial in that it leads to a “knee-jerk reaction” rather than 
to an evaluation of the pros and cons of a particular action.75 Every society 
has leadership, from a family to a club, a school, or Congress. And in each 
such group there is a leader or a group of leaders, from fathers (or fathers 
and mothers) to teachers and party leaders. They are the ones who establish 
or induce others to follow a certain group-culture. 
In a business organization, the leadership is usually endowed with rank 
signals to clarify and establish their position (although there are controlling 
persons who bear no title).76 To some extent, Codes of Ethics help leaders 
in financial advisory services to establish a culture that prohibits insider-
trading. It may be the culture that causes every access person to say: “We 
do not do this here!” Such a culture finds many reasons to justify the 
prohibition, such as the support of the law; the approval of the professional 
and the leadership of business organizations; public reputation; trust, 
loyalty, and devotion of investors and employees; significant profits; and 
the satisfaction of controlling much money and affecting the social welfare. 
If violations by insider-trading threaten the strength of all these factors, then 
insider-trading is a danger to be prevented. And the best way to prevent it is 
to make clear to the rank and file as well as co-management that such an 
action will not be tolerated. 
When these benefits to high-ranking leadership exist, there is a good 
chance that insider-trading can be reigned-in, if not eradicated entirely. The 
Codes of Ethics in the financial advisory area may demonstrate this. 
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2013] Self-Regulation of Insider-Trading 91 
CONCLUSION 
As money managers serve more investors, pool more securities, and 
combine their securities-pools with other pools, investors and outside 
regulators are less able to uncover, let alone control, the activities of these 
money managers. Many financial services can be carried out without 
detection; many wrongful actions can be justified as good business 
practices and efficient services. The danger to the financial system from 
wrongful activities can be devastating. Societies cannot afford to wait until 
the harm of such activities is done.   
Codes of Ethics are focused on prevention rather than punishment. 
Compliance Officers and top management can more easily detect possible 
violations and uproot them. Effective compliance might be practiced within 
the institutions in the shadow of the law. Mutual funds and advisers’ Codes 
of Ethics and their enforcement offer one fairly effective model.       
